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Arbitral institutions like to be discreet, and would perhaps be content if it were generally assumed that they perform a
merely clerical and administrative function. Such a posture would be untenable. The tasks necessarily allocated to
such bodies are central to any assessment of the legitimacy of the arbitral process. Given that commentators those
looking for a soapbox seem to find it easy to have categorical opinions about arbitration, with an intensity inversely
proportional to their acquaintance with facts, this is a welcome book, dispassionate but critical, which should allows its
readers to bring greater discipline to their analysis-whatever may be their ideological predispositions.
Behind a deceptively bland title, R6my Gerbay provides a conceptual framework which should allow evaluation of the
international arbitral mechanism to be conducted with greater seriousness. A French scholar who has particularly
cosmopolitan credentials, he holds degrees not only from his native country but also Switzerland, the United States,
and the United Kingdom; and practicing licenses in the US and England. Now a lecturer at the School of International
Arbitration at Queen Mary University of London, he had previously distinguished himself as a young Deputy Registrar
of the London Court of International Arbitration-an experience which allows him to write with authority and meaningful
perspectives on this subject.
In the national sphere, consumer arbitration is a salient example of the controversies that arise. Arbitration clauses,
some say, is the dark art of unscrupulous corporations seeking to evade responsibility for their products and services
by making it nigh on impossible for consumers to seek effective redress. The only thing left to do, in this view, is to treat
arbitration clauses as presumptively unconscionable. Yet the school is out on two important questions: is it not possible
to police abuse of asymmetrical bargaining power in arbitration clauses, for example by powerful safety valves like the
American Arbitration Association's Due Process Protocol? And is it a foregone conclusion that there is no type of
arbitration which actually benefits consumers, despite the contrary conclusion of a number of studies?
International arbitration is criticized as a way of neutralizing sovereignty, displacing public courts with private decisionmakers who tend to disregard the public interest. In answer, its defenders point out that especially outside the cleanest
and institutionally most mature states, it is very much open to doubt that the court do a better job of looking out for the
interests of ordinary citizens. Moreover, they point out that countries must provide credible neutral adjudication of legal
rights and obligations, lest suffer from having the cost of all their international dealings augmented by a legal risk
premium.
Arbitration constitutes the delegation of decision-making authority to persons who do not hold public office. As Gerbay
perceives quite clearly, delegation generally implies some measure of residual control, or the thing would not be the
delegation of authority but its simple relinquishment. Contrary to a widely-held belief (see below), arbitrants in the
international domain are anything but sanguine about the idea of giving arbitrators free reign in the way they run the
arbitral process (as opposed to-and no doubt as a counterpart of-according finality to their decision on the merits,
without which arbitration would lose its appeal).
So who exercises this control? Who decides if the tribunals will have three members or only one? Who appoints
arbitrators when the parties fail to agree? Who decides whether a candidate nominated by a party is unfit? Who
considers petitions to remove arbitrators for misconduct? Who decides what their fees should be? What about
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selecting the place of arbitration, consolidating claims, joining parties? It would be odd if this had to be national courts,
given the asymmetry between international arbitration and national courts; when the arbitrants are of two different
nationalities, the involvement of national courts can only be the product of the agreement or voluntary conduct of the
parties, and is therefore functionally just a variant of delegation. Above all, each arbitrant is likely to be wary of its
adversary's home courts, and if the parties were attracted by third country courts they might as well have asked them
to decide the case as a whole-as some courts in a few countries are willing to do even where they otherwise would not
have jurisdiction.
That leaves arbitral institutions. Many of them insist that they fulfill nothing but an administrative function, and vaunt
their "hands-off" approach. This is in a sense the fundamental and proper recognition that they have not been chosen
by the parties to decide. On the other hand, the appointment and removal of arbitrators may be viewed as a critical
function entailing controversial determinations. The modest labelling of the institutional role as "administrative" may
seem somewhat like the practice of police detectives using unmarked vehicles in an attempt to blend in with the
background, an unremarkable feature of daily routine. The car may be unmarked, but the conduct of the detective,
when it affects rights of due process (e.g. the proper gathering of evidence) cannot be so dismissed.
Like it or not, the permanent institutions that administer arbitrations cannot hide behind the fiction that they are
providing merely managerial functions; they are to some degree answerable for deficits in the legitimacy of the
process. Have they done what they can? More than that one cannot ask, but that much yes.
Moreover, the seemingly unrecognized fact is that users want international arbitral institutions to be hands-on. Gerbay
reports that a survey of in-house counsel in 2013 found that more than 70% of the respondents wanted a "hands-on"
rather than "hands-off" approach to case management by institutions. Less than 5% wanted the opposite. (One quarter
were undecided, perhaps because they would have said "that depends on the institution.") More hands-on means more
accountable. Gerbay quotes the Olympian personnage of Pierre Lalive, the Swiss maftre-penseur of international
arbitration whose seminal publications dominated the field in the 1970s and 1980s; he once wrote of the "legal
schizophrenia" of arbitral institutions who claim to exercise "simultaneously a quasi-judicial mission" so as to justify
their immunity and a "purely administrative mission" so as to avoid being held to the duty to ensure due process. (P.
191.)
Challenges to institutional decision-making have led to a number of judicial pronouncements, especially by the courts
of France where the best-known international institute is located, namely the International Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce. The very first in the digest provided by Gerbay is instructive. It is known by the
name of the losing (and objecting) party, Appareils Dragon. It wound its way up to the Court of Cassation in 1983. The
question was simple: given that the default rule of the French arbitration statute required awards to be rendered within
six months, and that the ICC Rules provided that the institution could extend that deadline, was an award rendered by
arbitrators following such an extension subject to annulment because the institution had not given reasons for its
'administrative" decision? Surely a losing argument, we might immediately say-and the highest French Court agreed.
But one can hardly be satisfied by the essential passage of its judgment (in Gerbay's translation), referring to the ICC
in the following terms: "lacking the quality of arbitrator, [it] was not bound to provide reasons for its decision of
prolongation, which did not have a jurisdictional character." (P. 127.)
The nature of a decision implying the exercise of a "jurisdictional" function is hardly self-defining. Imagine a case
pending before an unknown arbitration institute in a country far down on the Transparency International corruption
index. After the commencement of arbitration, the institute takes no steps to constitute the tribunal but periodically
extends the limit for proceedings. Years pass. This may suit the respondent just fine, as arbitral litispendence on the
face of it prevents alternative pursuits of remedies. Justice is denied to the claimant, who suspects collusion. Surely
there comes a point when courts elsewhere will no longer accept that the institution is merely administering the case,
but consider that conduct is equivalent to depriving the claimant of the right of legal redress.
Gerbay does not propose detailed prescriptions; nor could he produce a formula, given the infinite variety of situations
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in which the legitimacy of the process may be tested. His important conclusion is an overarching one: arbitral
institutions are not mere managers; they are what he calls "ancillary participants in the adjudicative process." (P.185.)
Will this conception bring about a dangerous blurring of the line between the arbitral and institutional functions, and
subject institutions to costly and endless disputation initiated by unscrupulous respondents? Gerbay's study, admirably
well-documented with respect both to practice and commentary, answers this question in the negative. The fact that
some dispositions made by institutions are difficult to distinguish from substantive adjudication is no excuse for seeking
to hide the fact that they may materially affect the outcome - and will ultimately fool no one. In the long run, institutions
must attend to the fundamental and well-known criteria of institutional legitimacy: striving for transparency, and striving
against capture, cronyism, and entrenchment. If they do so, and fully assimilate the importance of observable fairness
as they make indispensable determinations on the periphery of the core decision-making function reserved to
arbitrators, they need not fear accountability, but may comfortably embrace it.
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